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Abstract
The membership of British political parties has a direct influence on their political effectiveness. This paper
applies the mathematics of epidemiology to the analysis of the growth and decline of such memberships.
The party members are divided into activists and inactive members, where all activists influence the quality
of party recruitment, but only a subset of activists recruit and thus govern numerical growth. The activists
recruit for only a limited period, which acts as a restriction on further party growth. This Limited Activist
model is applied to post-war and recent memberships of the Labour, Scottish National and Conservative
parties. The model reproduces data trends, and relates realistically to historical narratives. It is concluded
that the political parties analysed are not in danger of extinction but experience repeated periods of growth
and decline in membership, albeit at lower numbers than in the past.
Keywords: Political Parties, Social Diffusion, Differential Equations, Epidemics, Population Models,
Sociophysics.
1. Introduction
Political parties play a vital role in the governance of countries. They provide the personnel out of which
national and local leaders emerge, a legitimate political identity for those in government, and an arena in
which policy can be formed. Even when not in power, parties can provide checks and balances by providing
an opposition, both in democratic forums and outside. As such there is keen interest in their growth and
decline.
Many theories of political party growth consider the relationship between its membership size and its
growth. One of the earliest such theories was Michels’ “Iron Law of Oligarchy” which states that any form
of organisation will eventually develop an oligarchy as it grows to the point where real democracy becomes
difficult [1]. The reasons given for this oligarchy are that a large complex organisation requires a specialist
bureaucracy in order to make efficient day to day decisions, thus inevitably removing the rank and file
members from the centre of power. Michels applied this theory, originally published in 1915, to the growing
socialist parties of Europe, showing that they evolved into oligarchies as did earlier conservative parties,
despite all their ideals. This has clear implications for the growth of a party as the membership suffers
diminishing ability to become involved in decision making, rendering membership less attractive.
Tan [2] hypothesised that there would be a direct effect of increasing party size on member participation
and growth due to free riding, that is becoming inactive, as proposed by Olson [3], as well as there being
an indirect effect due to increasing complexity, as put forward by Michels [1]. Using data on 23 political
parties [4], Tan argued that although party size can directly reduce participation, the indirect effect through
increasing complexity can positively influence the participation of members, thus contradicting that aspect
of Michel’s law. Although the debate as to the effect of party size on participation is still not resolved [e.g.
5, 6, 7] it is clear that there is a potential limit to the size of a political party related to its ability to keep
members active. This suggests the importance of activists in the growth of the party.
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The importance of activists in the interests of a political party has been emphasised by Seyd and Whiteley
[5], noting their role in fund raising, political legitimacy, and as a source of voters, campaigners and potential
candidates for parties. However they argue that party decline is due to choice rather than the structural
reasons of Tan [2] and Michels [1]. They further claim that a party chooses to restrict the supply of activists
as they can also be a hindrance to the party leadership’s freedom of action. The reduction in the benefits
for party membership, and the restriction of activists, is thus deemed to be one of the causes of the decline.
In this case party growth comes from the often brief periods during which a party requires activists for
electoral purposes.
Further support for belief in the importance of the role of activists in party growth is provided by Weldon
[6] and Norris [8] who both showed that small parties have a higher degree of activism compared with larger
parties due to the lack of funds to support a professional organisational structure. It is thus suggested that
larger parties find it harder to grow, as the reduced incentives that can be offered are insufficient to keep
activists in the party or to maintain their level of activism.
However a decline in party size does not necessarily increase activism as the party can remain organisa-
tionally complex if it lacks the funds to support the change back to a state in which activism could again
flourish [9]. By contrast some parties can develop complex structures to make organisation and activity
more efficient and effective [2]. These phenomena suggest that activism is a natural feature of the smaller
and growing party, but not of the larger and diminishing. However, larger parties are capable of sustaining
activism, at least during those periods where activism is not contrary to the oligarchy’s aims. In either case,
activism is the cause of growth.
It is inevitable in the light of the above that much of the attention on change in party size concentrates
on decline [7, 9, 10, 11], with less attention being given to the mechanisms behind their growth. Discussions
on growth generally focus on the reasons why parties wish to grow and the incentives provided for such
increases in membership [5, 6]. There has been less discussion on how parties grow but it is clear that
activists, those most involved in the life of the party, are key to its growth [8, 11].
The question needs to be asked as to how activists recruit new members to the party. Jefferys [12]
points to very specific recruitment campaigns that dramatically increased the membership of the main UK
political parties in the immediate post-war period. These campaigns were largely carried out using door-
to-door recruitment by the most active members of the parties. Also a deliberate recruitment strategy by
the Labour party from 1994 resulted in it temporarily becoming the fastest growing party in Europe [11, p.
24]. These periods of growth could be explained in terms of a word-of-mouth phenomenon driven by party
activists.
This paper proposes a word-of-mouth model of political party growth using ideas similar to mathematical
epidemiology. The model divides the party into activists and inactive members. Activists are further divided
into those who recruit (the “infectious”) and those who do not recruit. However non-recruiting activists do
contribute to the party by discouraging new members from free riding. Thresholds of growth are computed
and the results of the model are compared with historical party data from the UK.
2. Previous Models of Social Diffusion
Word-of-mouth models for social diffusion and organisational growth are not new. Burbeck et al. [13]
used an SIR model to investigate the spread of rioting, applying the model to three riots from the 1960s.
Similar models with more variables have been applied to riots, public outrage and terrorist groups [14, 15, 16].
Other models dealing with the spread of behaviour include language acquisition [17, 18], alcohol con-
sumption [19, 20], cigarette smoking [21] and psychological/social diseases such as bulimia and obesity
[22, 23]. Most of these models employ multiple sub-populations with one or more acting as infectious agents
and at least one non-infectious. In contrast, the influential Abram-Strogatz model [17] assumes there is
no non-infectious category, a specific feature of language acquisition, making it less applicable to the other
behaviours modelled.
Additionally epidemiological ideas have been applied to the spread of rumours [24, 25], ideologies [26,
27] and online networks [28, 29, 30]. Bettencourt et al. [31] modelled the spread in the use of Feynman
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diagrams throughout the scientific community. Their model allowed for some new recruits to the Feynman
methodology to be non-infectious, an exposed class, thus allowing for a weaker growth in recruiters compared
with all users of the methodology.
None of the above models involve organisational membership as seen in political parties. However models
close to these ideas have been used for the spread of religious affiliation. Hayward [32, 33] applied SIR type
models to church and denominational membership where the infectious church members responsible for
recruitment, called “enthusiasts”, were a subset of new recruits. The models were applied to a range of
religious denominations which could be categorised as experiencing rapid growth, as stable or as heading
for extinction. Like Bettencourt et al. [31], Hayward [33] also allowed for some new recruits to be non-
infectious. By contrast Ochoche and Gweryina [34], Madubueze and Nwaokolo [35] considered the longest
serving church members as the recruiters. McCartney and Glass [36] modelled a variety of recruitment
mechanisms, predicting that a range of denominations in Northern Ireland faced future extinction.
Additionally there are statistical physics models of religious adherence [37, 38, 39] that employ the
epidemiological analogy. In particular Ausloos and Petroni [40], Abrams et al. [41] draw the parallel between
the spread of language and religion. The model of Abrams et al. [41] has the same restriction of no inactive
members as the Abrams-Strogatz language acquisition model, on which it is based.
One specific epidemiological model related to political party growth was presented by Romero et al.
[42] who modelled the rise of third political parties in a state dominated by two parties. In the model the
third party seeks to recruit by changing voter opinion as small start-up parties do not have a voter base
from which to recruit. Results illustrate the critical role activists play in sustaining grassroots movements
and indentify conditions under which such minority parties can thrive. Although primarily about opinion
change, and not directly relevant to the growth of mainline political parties, their model will provide a useful
comparison in model construction. Additionally there are opinion dynamics models that link political party
size to party characteristics [43], and that model the influence of party activists on opinion change [44].
Although not exhaustive, the above review is sufficient to justify word-of mouth-modelling being applied
to political party growth and decline.
3. Initial Considerations
To investigate the hypothesis that political party growth is due to the recruitment activities of party
activists, the SIR epidemic model is taken as an initial exploratory model. This leads to the following
assumptions:
Assumption 1 The population is partitioned into susceptibles S, those who do not belong to the political
party, and party members P . Party members are further partitioned into activists A and inactive
members M . This latter group are only inactive in the sense of recruitment. They may still attend
party functions and engage in other activities.
Assumption 2 The activists take on the role of the infectives in a disease and the model assumes that
they only remain active for an average time τ .
Assumption 3 All new recruits become activists with the same average ability to recruit others to the
party.
Assumption 4 The contacts that activists make are limited by how many people they can meet in a given
time period, rather than by the density of the population in which they work. This is more in keeping
with deliberate door-to-door recruitment campaigns and other word-of-mouth phenomena in a large
population. Thus the standard incidence model of contacts is assumed, similar to that used in the
spread of sexually transmitted diseases [45].
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The model is intended to be applied to short time periods only, thus births, deaths, leaving and migration
are ignored. Thus the equations are:
dS
dt
= −
Cp
τN
SA (1)
dA
dt
=
Cp
τN
SA−
A
τ
(2)
dM
dt
=
A
τ
(3)
where N = S + A +M is the total adult population, a constant; homogeneous mixing has been assumed.
Cp is the recruitment potential, that is the number of susceptibles recruited, or converted, to the party by
one activist throughout their entire active period.
The condition for epidemic growth in the party can be derived from setting A˙ > 0 in (2), giving S/N >
1/Cp. This can be re-arranged to provide a threshold value for Cp over which an epidemic will occur:
Cp > 1/(S/N) , Cepi.
In this standard incidence SIR model the epidemic threshold Cepi depends on the fraction of susceptibles
alone. The larger the fraction susceptible, the lower the threshold and the less recruitment potential to
give epidemic party growth, as also seen in models of disease [46]. Thus rapid growth becomes harder to
achieve as the pool of susceptibles reduces, and party growth will cease because activists are no longer able
to reproduce themselves sufficiently quickly to make up for their losses. Growth ends before all people join
the party.
Importantly the threshold Cepi does not depend on the number of activists. One activist is sufficient to
start epidemic growth if the recruitment potential is sufficiently high (at least Cp > 1 ) and the proportion of
susceptibles in the population is sufficient. This assumes activists can reproduce activists from their recruits
with the same ability to recruit. In this case Cp is the equivalent of the basic reproduction number R0 for
the epidemic [45, 46].
To test the SIR model, data from the UK Labour party are used from 1947–1953 (Table A.5), a period of
rapid growth resulting from a deliberate door-to-door recruitment campaign by the party with the intention
of making every Labour voter a party member, [12, pp. 93–99]. The party membership, P = A+M , in the
model (1–3) is compared with the data using a Runge-Kutta-Fehlberg method and optimised using least
squares. Because of the uncertainty in the fraction of the adult population reached by activists during the
period, three optimised runs are produced: (i) N = 33.24 million, the electorate in the 1945 election, those
with a known interest in politics [47]; (ii) N = 11.995 million, the number of Labour voters in the 1945
general election, the people worth an activist spending time with [47]; and (iii) N = 5 million, a more
conservative estimate based on average pre-war union membership, the hard core Labour supporters [48].
It is unclear the extent to which the recruitment campaign was targeted towards likely recruits through, for
example, the trade union movement.
The model parameters estimated for the three population sizes, (i)–(iii), are respectively Cp = 1.025,
1.073, 1.194 ; τ = 1.1939, 0.0100, 0.0283 and A0/P0 = 0.005%, 0.011%, 0.040%. In each case the threshold
Cepi exceeds the recruitment potential from about 1949, indicating the slowing down of party growth.
Irrespective of the target population size, the durations spent as activist, τ , are very small, merely a matter
of weeks at best. While this may be an acceptable duration for a spreader in word-of-mouth diffusion, it
is far too short a period for a political activist, some of whom remain active for many years [12]. Such a
short duration leads to an unacceptably small number of activists, less than 1% of the party at the peak.
Estimates of party activists for major political parties range from 30-40% [4, ch. 12] [8, p. 127]. Thus the
SIR model is not suitable as a model of political party growth without modification.
It is proposed that the fault in the modelling lies with the identification of recruiters with activists.
Recruitment is only a small part of an activist’s role in the party; most of their time is spent on campaigning,
fund raising and political discussion [6, 8, 11]. Pedersen et al. [49] found that only 10% of activists spent
more than 5 hours a month on recruitment and electoral duties, indicating that recruitment is very much a
minority activity of party activists. Thus it is proposed in the next section that the model be extended to
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allow for recruiting and non-recruiting activists, giving the latter a distinct dynamical role in the quality,
rather than the quantity, of recruitment.
4. Limited Activist Model Construction
The model of Section 3 is modified to distinguish between activists who recruit and those who do not. All
activists have a role in determining the quality of the party as measured by the proportion who are active.
Further the issue as to what fraction of the population is genuinely open to joining the party is resolved by
introducing a separate population of people hardened against the party beliefs. The revised model will be
referred to as the Limited Activist model.
Assumption 1 The population is partitioned into party members P and non-party members. Party mem-
bers are further partitioned into recruiting activists I, non-recruiting activists A and inactive members
M . This latter group are free-riders who do not participate in any party activities. The non-recruiting
activists contribute to the political activity of the party but are ineffective in recruitment. The non-
party members are partitioned into susceptibles S, those open to the party because of their political
persuasion, and hardened H , those sufficiently opposed to the party that they would never become
members.
Assumption 2 The recruiting activists take on the role of the infectives in the spread of a disease and
become non-recruiting activists after an average time τi. Non-recruiting activists become inactive
after an average time τa. It is expected τa ≫ τi as recruitment is only carried out by a small minority
of activists at any one time.
Assumption 3 All new recruits may become either type of activist, or inactive members.
Assumption 4 The contacts that activists make are limited by how many people they can meet in a given
time period, rather than by the density of the population in which they work.
Assumption 5 All activists influence the number of recruits who themselves become active according to
the proportion of activists in the party. That is a more politically active party will have more politically
active recruits.
Assumption 6 Inactive members leave the party at a fixed rate α and are open to rejoining, reflecting the
ease with which members may lapse through non-renewal of membership.
Following from the above assumptions, the equations of the Limited Activist Model are:
dS
dt
= −
Cp
τiN
SI + αM (4)
dI
dt
= g
Cp
τiN
SI −
I
τi
(5)
dA
dt
= f(1− g)
Cp
τiN
SI +
I
τi
−
A
τa
(6)
dM
dt
= (1− f)(1− g)
Cp
τiN
SI +
A
τa
− αM (7)
where
f = f(AT ) ,
I +A
P
(8)
represents the fraction of those new recruits who do not become recruiters, but who nevertheless contribute
to the party activism rather than free-riding. The coefficient g is the fraction of recruits who become
recruiters, Cp is the recruitment potential, and total active membership AT = I +A.
The total population N = H + S + I + A + M ; total open population with sympathy for the party
O = N −H ; and total party membership P = I + A +M . As the model is intended only for short-term
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growth and decline, births and deaths are excluded and the hardened H and total population N are assumed
constant. Thus (S, I, A,M) are determined by (4–7) with the stated constraints.
Multiple influential populations have been used in structurally similar models of the diffusion of bulimia
[22], binge drinking [19], rumours [25], public violence [15], terrorist groups [16] and political opinion change
[42]. This mechanism is required to allow for party members in I and A to have different types of activity;
in particular many party activists do not recruit [6, 8, 49]. The Limited Activist model proposes that the
influence of non-recruiting activists is on the quality of recruits, determined by f(AT ), rather than on the
quantity as in epidemiological mass action. However this does increase the number of activists at the expense
of the inactive. Galam and Wonczak [43] have also modelled the influence of party size on the qualitative
characteristics of a party, especially the role of activists in that process [44].
Multiple routes from susceptibles into different populations are used in the diffusion of scientific ideas [31],
rumours [25], religion [33] and terrorist groups [16]. Likewise Romero et al. [42] have constant proportions
entering different voter populations. What is different in the proposed Limited Activist model is that, rather
than the proportions of recruits entering the three party member categories being fixed, the proportion
becoming activists, f(AT ), can vary, allowing a highly active party to become more active, even if numerical
recruitment is moderate. This is required to account for the differing effects of recruitment by parties with
different levels of activism. For example Whiteley and Seyd [11, p. 126] note the poor quality of recruits in
the Labour party in the 1990s, when the party was relatively inactive compared with campaigns in previous
generations where activity, not just numbers, was improved.
Multiple susceptible populations with different degrees of susceptibility were proposed by Granovetter
[50] and have been used in the diffusion of binge drinking [19], religion [33], terrorist groups [16], riots [14]
and knowledge diffusion [51]. The Limited Activist model proposes two such populations, one aligned to
the party, S, and one opposed, H . It is assumed that the latter would not change political alignment and
join the party on the timescales being considered.
5. Analysis
As with the SIR model the epidemic threshold follows from I˙ > 0. Let Rp = gCp, the reproduction
potential, or basic reproductive ratio, which measures how many recruiting activists one recruiting activist
reproduces during their recruiting period, assuming the whole population N is susceptible. Then from (5)
Rp >
1
S¯
, Repi (9)
whereRepi is the threshold value for the reproduction potential, above which there is an epidemic of recruiting
activists. Barred variables denote the fraction of the total population N : S¯ = S/N .
Setting (5) to zero gives either I = 0 or S¯ = 1/Rp. The former is the equivalent of the disease-free
equilibrium (DFE) where the party vanishes (1 − H¯, 0, 0, 0).
The other equilibria will be determined from S¯ = 1/Rp. Applying this to (4) set to zero, with A¯ =
1− H¯ − S¯ − I¯ − M¯ gives:
A¯ = pˆ− qˆI¯ (10)
where
pˆ = 1− H¯ −
1
Rp
(11)
qˆ =
gατi + 1
gατi
. (12)
Further, f = 1− I¯/(gατipˆ), using pˆ = I¯ + A¯+ M¯ . Thus a single equation for I¯ can be obtained by setting
(6) to zero, and the substitution of f and A¯ (10), giving:
a1I¯
2
− b1I¯ + c1 = 0 (13)
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with
a1 =
(1 − g)
g2ατ2i
(14)
b1 = pˆ
[
1
gτi
+
qˆ
τa
]
(15)
c1 =
pˆ2
τa
(16)
Thus
I¯± =
b1 ±
√
b21 − 4a1c1
2a1
(17)
Note that a1 and c1 are always positive and the sign of b1 depends on the sign of pˆ, as qˆ is positive.
Thus there are two endemic equilibria (EE) with differing recruiting activists, I¯± but the same party size
P = N − H − S, given by (1/Rp, I±, pˆ − qˆI¯±, I¯±/(gατi)). Both roots of (13) are real as its discriminant
reduces to: [
τa −
1
α
]2
+ 2τagτi + g
2τ2i + 2
gτi
α
+
4gτa
α
which is always positive (14–16). Neither root is physical when pˆ < 0, as from (17) I¯± < 0. However the one
root is never physical as A+ = pˆ− qˆI¯+ is always negative (Appendix B). Thus there are only two relevant
equilibrium points, the DFE and a single EE given by I− in (17), the latter only physical when pˆ > 0.
Stability of the two remaining equilibria is deduced from the Jacobian of (4–7):
J =


−
CpI¯
τi
−
CpS¯
τi
0 α
gCpI¯
τi
gCpS¯
τi
− 1
τi
0 0
f(1− g)
CpI¯
τi
f(1− g)
CpS¯
τi
+ 1
τi
+ f,I¯Q −
1
τa
+ f,A¯Q f,M¯Q
(1− f)(1− g)
CpI¯
τi
(1 − f)(1− g)
CpS¯
τi
− f,I¯Q
1
τa
− f,A¯Q −α− f,M¯Q

 (18)
where f,I¯ , ∂f/∂I¯ etc, and Q = (1− g)CpS¯I¯.
For the DFE the eigenvalues λ of (18) are:
λ
(
gCpS¯
τi
−
1
τi
− λ
)(
1
τa
+ λ
)
(α+ λ) = 0. (19)
One eigenvalue is zero, as expected for a conserved system, and two are always negative. Thus stability of
the DFE is determined by the remaining eigenvalue. As S¯ = 1 − H¯ in equilibrium then the DFE is stable
when: Rp(1− H¯)/τi < 1/τi or
Rp <
1
1− H¯
, Rext (20)
where Rext is termed the extinction threshold, and unstable when Rp > Rext. If the reproduction potential
is less than this threshold the party becomes extinct. If above the threshold the party will survive and reach
the EE, with epidemic growth first if Rp is above the epidemic threshold. Note the extinction threshold is
always below the epidemic threshold: Rext ≤ Repi.
When the DFE is stable, Rp < Rext and then, from (11), pˆ < 0 and, as noted earlier, the EE is not
physical. By contrast when the reproduction potential is above the extinction threshold then the DFE is
unstable, pˆ > 0, and thus the EE is physical and the party settles on a non-zero equilibrium. Thus the
model displays a similar transcritical bifurcation as occurs in an SIRS model.
6. Results
The model is applied to three periods of rapid political party growth in the UK: the Labour Party from
post-war and in the 1990s, and the Scottish National Party (SNP) post 2000. In addition the model is
applied to the recent decline in the membership of the UK Conservative Party.
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6.1. UK Labour Party 1944–1953
The data, Table A.5, may be considered in three phases according to the change in numbers and historical
evidence [12].
Firstly, the rise in membership 1944–1945 is due to the renewal of former members who had disengaged
during the Second World War.
The second phase is associated with the short recruitment campaign of 1945–46. This was mainly
conducted door to door, and followed on from the enthusiasm due to the Labour general election victory
of 1945. This phase is assumed to have involved a high initial number of activists, including recruiting
activists. To estimate the total number of activists it is assumed the mid-war low of 219,000 [48] is a lower
limit to the number of activists, those keen enough to retain membership during the war. Assume further
that some activists re-joined in the first phase. Thus it is estimated that the second phase started with
about 250,000 activists.
The Limited Activist model was applied to the rise in data 1945–46 from 487,000 to 645,000, and the
post campaign decline to 608,000 in 1947. The most convincing data fit has the reproduction potential
under the epidemic threshold with the growth due to a high initial number of recruiting activists of about
I0 = 4000. This leaves about 200,000 total activists in 1947, which corresponds to roughly a third of the
party active, as also reported by Janda [4] and Norris [8]. This figure is used as the initial value in the third
phase of growth, which is examined in greater detail.
The third phase of growth in Labour party membership ran from 1947–1953 and was a more measured
campaign conducted through the Trade Union movement as well as door to door. The UK electorate
is used as the total population N , which is close to the adult population. The total open population
O = S + I + A +M is taken from those who voted Labour in 1945, i.e. those already members or open
to joining due to their political persuasion. The time as a non-recruiting activist, τa is assumed to be 10
years. This is supported by Jefferys [12], who notes that a typical activist will be involved in at least one
electoral campaign, implying up to 5 years as an activist. However the average figure will be higher than
this as a number of activists remain so for life. The leaving rate α is taken as 5% consistent with the average
post-campaign decline to 1960 of 3% per annum. No attempt to fit values 1954–1960 was made as the high
volatility in change was assumed to be due to political factors for which a differential equation can only
model the average. However, the 5% leaving rate ensured the model was close to the 1961 figure of 751,000.
This figure was the last year of decline in this phase [48].
The remaining parameters were obtained by least squares with a value for the fraction of recruits who
become recruiters g of 0.5, consistent with Jefferys [12] and ensuring a high ratio of activist to inactive in the
party. The 1951 data point was ignored as Labour lost an election that year and it is assumed the sudden
drop was a temporary reaction, followed by rejoining in 1952. The parameter values are given in Table 1.
Estimated Parameters Value Source
Total population N 33.24 mill UK electorate 1945 election [47]
Open population O = 1−H 11.995 mill Labour voters 1945 election [47]
Initial party membership P0 608,000 Party data [48]
Initial activists AT0 = I0 +A0 200,000 Estimate from mid-war low and
roughly a third of party active [4, 8]
Duration non recruiting activist τa 10 years Estimate anecdotal evidence [12]
Leaving rate α 0.05 Estimate from post 1952 decline [48]
Fraction infected recruited g 0.5 High ratio of active to inactive recruits
Recruitment potential Cp 5.9501 Optimised
Duration recruiting activist τi 0.0144 Optimised
Initial recruiting Activists I0 139 Optimised
Table 1: Parameter Values for Limited Activist Model of UK Labour Party Membership 1947–1953
A good fit is made to party data 1947–53, with the exception of 1951, a year with poor election results
for Labour, Fig. 1(a). The largest share of recruitment is due to the recruiting activists, reflecting the
known highly active nature of the party, Fig. 1(b). Although the recruiting activists peak at about 1949,
Fig. 1(c), the total number of activists does not peak until two years later, rising from a third to 42% of the
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party. They do not return to the pre-campaign values until 1959, showing that the effect of the campaign on
party activity was sustained until long after the epidemic phase was over [12]. The reproduction potential,
Rp is well above the extinction threshold, Fig. 1(d), and above the epidemic threshold in 1947. The latter
threshold rises due to the shrinking susceptible pool, but by 1960 is back below Rp, indicating that another
period of growth may have naturally occurred in the 1960s due to shifting recycling of party members who
left. It is more likely that political events in the 1960s initiated the post 1961 growth that did occur. The
interpretation of periodicity in membership numbers will be discussed in the conclusion.
1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953
Year
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
P
a
rt
y
 M
e
m
b
e
rs
h
ip
 (
m
ill
io
n
 p
e
rs
o
n
s
)
aUK Labour Party Data Fitting 1947-1953
1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953
Year
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
R
e
c
ru
it
m
e
n
t 
R
a
te
s
 (
th
o
u
s
a
n
d
 p
e
rs
o
n
s
/y
e
a
r)
Recruiting Activists
Non-Recruiting Activists
Inactive Members
b
1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960
Year
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
P
a
rt
y
 P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
s
 (
m
ill
io
n
 p
e
rs
o
n
s
)
0
500
1000
1500
R
e
c
ru
tin
g
 A
c
tiv
is
ts
 (p
e
rs
o
n
s
)
Party Members
Inactive Members
Activists
Recruiting Activists
c
1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960
Year
2.7
2.8
2.9
3
3.1
(p
e
rs
o
n
s
/p
e
rs
o
n
)
Reproduction Potential
Epidemic Threshold
Extinction Threshold
dThresholds
Fig. 1: Limited Activist Model applied to UK Labour Party. (a) Data fitting 1947–1953; (b) Recruitment rates to party
membership sub-populations I, A, M ; (c) Party membership P and sub-populations I, I + A, M ; (d) Thresholds Repi, Rext,
compared with reproduction potential Rp.
Not all the parameters could be estimated by data fitting, or from other known values. For example the
parameter g, the fraction of recruits who become recruiting activists, was set at 0.5. Alternative data fits
were obtained for other values of g = 0.2 and g = 1. In the first case the number of activists in the party
declined too quickly compared with the historical narratives or the time. In the later case the activists rose
too high. Thus 0.5 is taken as a good compromise, with the model robust against small variations in this
value. A similar argument can be applied to the initial number of activists AT0 = I0 + A0, and to time
active τa, neither of whose values are critical.
6.2. UK Labour Party 1993–1997
In 1992 the leadership of the Labour Party passed to John Smith who set about a recruitment campaign
to rebuild the party in a time of internal disillusionment, after a lengthy period out of electoral office [11, 12].
Thus the start of the rise in party numbers is taken from 1993. The intention of Smith, and his successor
from 1994 Tony Blair, was to increase membership in order to win the 1997 general election. This they
succeeding in doing, with party membership rising to a peak in 1997, Table A.6.
As with Labour in the 1940s the initial population and open population are taken from the electorate
and voter base of the election prior to the simulation. The duration non-recruiting activist is set at 10 years
9
for the same reasons as before. The fraction of activists is taken to be lower than the 1947 case, reflecting
the poor state of engagement of the party membership in 1993 [11, 12]. The leaving rate is set at 15%
reflecting the greater nominal party membership in the late 20th century, compared with the 1940s, and
from the post 2000 decline. Membership of political parties has to be renewed annually, and thus people can
leave by default unless they intentionally rejoin. The fraction recruited to the recruiting activists was taken
to be lower than the 1947 case, g = 0.2, as the party’s intention was to increase its size to gain legitimacy
for the 1997 election, rather than to build a permanent active membership [11].
Data were fitted to the Limited Activist model from 1993–1998 (Table A.6), the latest year a good fit
can be obtained, although the 1999 data point is also reasonable (Table 2, Fig. 2(a)). The inactive members
have the largest recruitment, in the early part of the campaign, with a more even balance later, Fig. 2(b).
The recruiting activists peak before the end of 1994, not even rising to double their initial number, Fig.
2(c), yet this is sufficient to drive the large increase in the party and the total activists. The latter peak in
1997, the year of Labour’s general election victory, Fig. 2(c), is consistent with the known enthusiasm of
the party at that time [11]. The peak value of around a third of the party membership is typical of party
activism for a healthy party [4, 8].
Estimated Parameters Value Source
Total population N 43.25 mill UK electorate 1992 election [47]
Open population O = 1−H 11.56 mill Labour voters 1992 election [47]
Initial party membership P0 266,000 Party data [48]
Initial activists AT0 = I0 +A0 50,000 Estimate lower than one third of party active
due to prior internal party conflict. [4, 8]
Duration non recruiting activist τa 10 years Estimate similar to Labour 1940s
Leaving rate α 0.15 Estimate from post 1997 decline[48]
and presence of nominal members[11].
Fraction infected recruited g 0.2 Low ratio of active to inactive recruits
Recruitment potential Cp 19.2712 Optimised
Duration recruiting activist τi 0.00945 Optimised
Initial recruiting Activists I0 101 Optimised
Table 2: Parameter Values for Limited Activist Model of UK Labour Party Membership 1993–1998
The epidemic threshold starts below the reproduction potential, initiating the rapid growth in the party,
with growth ceasing as the threshold reaches its peak, Fig. 2(d). For fixed values of the recruitment potential
Cp and leaving rate α it is impossible to mimic the decline after 1998, the post election phase. Indeed had
those values remained the party would have started growing again, in the early 2000s. However if the leaving
rate is allowed to rise from 1998, and the recruitment potential to fall, perhaps due to the increasing focus of
the party on government rather than retention and activism, then the data can be replicated to 2004. The
reproduction potential falls, staying under the epidemic threshold and approaching the extinction threshold,
perhaps typical of a party giving little attention to its membership, Fig. 2(d).
6.3. Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) 2003–2013
In 2003 the SNP failed to win power in Scotland for a second time in succession. In addition they lost
members and chose to change leadership in order to rebuild the party. Alex Salmond became leader in
2004, and under his leadership the party membership increased by 70% between 2003 and 2007, Table A.7,
achieving power as a minority government in 2007 [47, 52]. With the need to gain legitimacy, and thus
further members, for the 2011 Scottish parliament elections, the party saw another surge from 2010 to 2013,
Table A.7, winning the election outright. The data will be considered in these two natural phases, 2003-2010
and 2010-2013.
The initial population is taken from the typical Scottish electorate size 2003–2014, which remained
reasonably stable throughout. Because of the increase in popularity of the SNP throughout the period, the
open population is taken from an average of the SNP voters through all Scottish elections of the period.
It is noted that fewer people vote SNP in UK general elections, which probably does not reflect the true
sympathy for the party [47]. The duration non-recruiting activist and initial fraction activist are taken to
be the same as the Labour party in the 1940s, as the SNP pursued a similarly positive recruitment drive
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Fig. 2: Limited Activist Model applied to UK Labour Party. (a) Data fitting 1993–1998, showing deviation of model from
post 1998 decline; (b) Recruitment rates to party membership sub-populations I, A, M ; (c) Party membership P and sub-
populations I, I+A, M ; (d) Thresholds Repi, Rext, compared with reproduction potential Rp, assuming falling Rp, and rising
leaving rate α, to account for post 1998 drop.
[53]. Likewise the fraction recruited to recruiting activists, and the leaving rate, are taken to be the same
as 1940s Labour.
The Limited Activist model was fitted to data from 2003–2010 (the first phase) and then separately for
2010–2013 (the second phase), Table A.7. The party numbers and number of activists were matched at
2010, Fig. 3(a–b), but a change in the initial recruiting activists was needed for the second phase, Table 3.
The recruiting activists have their first peak just before the Scottish election of 2007 and the party growth
had almost finished by 2010, Fig. 3(b).
Estimated Parameters Value Source
Total population N 4 mill Scotland electorate typical
value 2003-2013 [54]
Open population O = 1−H 686,000 Average SNP voters 2003–2011
Scottish elections [47]
Initial party membership P0 9,500 Party data [48]
Initial activists AT0 = I0 + A0 33,000 Roughly a third of party active [4, 8]
Duration non recruiting activist τa 10 years Estimate similar to Labour 1940s.
Leaving rate α 0.05 Estimate similar to Labour 1940s.
Fraction infected recruited g 0.5 Estimate similar to Labour 1940s.
Recruitment potential Cp (i) 11.8842, (ii) 12.002 Optimised.
Duration recruiting activist τi (i) 0.0163, (ii) 0.01 Optimised.
Initial recruiting activists I0 (i) 8, (ii) 21 Optimised.
Table 3: Parameter Values for Limited Activist Model of SNP Membership (i) 2003–2010, (ii) 2010–2013.
In the second phase the party growth of 50% in 3 years is explained by a sudden jump in the number,
and effectiveness, of recruiting activists, Fig. 3(b,d), timed for the 2011 Scottish parliamentary elections.
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Fig. 3: Limited Activist Model applied to SNP. (a) Data fitting in two phases, 2003–2010 and 2010–2013; (b) Recruitment
rates to party membership sub-populations I, A, M ; (c) Party membership P and sub-populations I, I+A, M ; (d) Thresholds
Repi, Rext, compared with reproduction potential Rp.
The epidemic period ends early in the party growth, Fig. 3(d), with most of the party growth after this
period.
The model predicts that growth had finished by the time of the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum
campaign, Fig. 3(a), a long way short of the SNP’s target of doubling their party membership before
that date [53]. Subsequently, however, the party membership doubled within days of the referendum of
18/09/2014 which delivered a “No” result [55]. The latest figure available, 92,200 [56], shows an increase of
five times the 2010 value which the model does not predict. This indicates a limitation in the applicability
of the model, which will be discussed in the conclusion.
6.4. UK Conservative Party 2005–2012
The final application of the limited activism model is the period of sustained decline in the UK Conser-
vative Party that followed their brief rise from 2005 to 2006, Table A.8. The hypothesis is explored that
the decline is due to a large leaving rate with the recruitment potential remaining the same throughout the
growing and declining period.
Due to the weakness of the party following a period in which they had lost two successive general elections,
the duration non-recruiting activist is assumed to be shorter than the previous applications, τa = 5 years,
and the recruitment to recruiting activists as being low, g = 0.2. Likewise the initial number of activists is
taken as significantly less than the one third used in the growing party scenarios of the SNP and Labour
1940s. The rapid decline from 2006 indicates a high leaving rate of about α = 20%. Other population
parameters are set using the electorate and voter base, as before, Table 4.
The data fit is less precise than the other applications, Fig. 4(a). The reproduction potential is lower
than the epidemic threshold initially, Fig. 4(d), indicating that the growth to 2006 was due to a large
number of activists, rather than to their effectiveness in recruitment. The subsequent decline is not only
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due to a high leaving rate but also due to virtually no recruitment 2007–2011, Fig. 4(b), which leads to a
party that is proportionally more active due to the loss of inactive members, Fig. 4(c).
Estimated Parameters Value Source
Total population N 44.1802 mill UK electorate 2005 election [54]
Open population O = 1−H 8.7726 mill Conservative voters 2005 UK general election [47]
Initial party membership P0 258,000 Party data [48]
Initial activists AT0 = I0 + A0 84,000 Less than third of party active [4, 8]
a low value due to weakness of party.
Duration non recruiting activist τa 5 years Estimate lower than previous data fits
due to party unpopularity.
Leaving rate α 0.2 Estimate higher than previous data fits
to account for rapid decline during period.
Fraction infected recruited g 0.2 Low ratio of active to inactive recruits.
Recruitment potential Cp 25.769 Optimised.
Duration recruiting activist τi 0.0074 Optimised.
Initial recruiting Activists I0 182 Optimised.
Table 4: Parameter Values for Limited Activist Model of UK Conservative Party Membership 2005–2013
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Fig. 4: Limited Activist Model applied to UK Conservative Party. (a) Data fitting 2005–2013, extrapolated to 2014; (b)
Recruitment rates to party membership sub-populations I, A, M ; (c) Party membership P and sub-populations I, I + A, M ;
(d) Thresholds Repi, Rext, compared with reproduction potential Rp.
The reproduction potential is above the extinction threshold, Fig. 4(d). Thus the model predicts a return
to growth for the Conservative party from 2014. Although the party does not release official membership
figures, a tentative figure for 2014 of 149,800 [57] is in line with the model’s prediction. While there is
a long-term gradual decline in political party membership [5, 7], the short-term rapid decline of the sort
experienced by the Conservative party may be due to the dynamical effects of high leaving rates and moderate
reproduction of recruiting activists.
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7. Conclusion
The Limited Activist model was developed to investigate the hypothesis that political parties grow
through the action of activists persuading non members to join through word of mouth. The basic SIR
construct gave a poor understanding of activists as “infected” spreaders of party membership due to the
very short duration as an activist. However the revised format, where activists were compartmentalised
into recruiters and non-recruiters was able to give convincing data fits for four different sets of data, with
realistic durations for activists. Together with compartmentalising the non-members into those open to
persuasion and those closed, each application of the model was able to give a narrative consistent with
historical evidence for the party in question. Thus the epidemic analogy as an explanation of political party
growth is strongly supported.
In all four application areas the reproduction potentials of the political parties were above the extinction
threshold, as might be expected of parties who periodically achieve power. Despite party decline, neither of
the three parties studied showed any indication that decline would lead to extinction, the DFE. Instead any
decline comes from high reproduction rates with high leaving rates and the periodicity this induces. Such
periodicity around the EE would not be expected to be perfect due to high variation in leaving rates from
exogenous political factors such as elections and periods of political power. The decline of the Labour Party
membership through the early 2000s could only be explained by such an increase in leaving rate, Section 6.2.
For constant rates the model explains a return to growth after a period of decline in terms of the recycling
of members. Given that in two of the applications studied the regrowth led to a return to political power
for the party, it is suggested that electoral success may be connected with the natural recycling of members
and its effect on activism.
In order for the concept of activists to have meaning in the model when only a fraction of them were
recruiting, and thus contributing to growth, the model allowed the fraction of all activists, f(At), to influence
the quality of recruitment. Thus the more active the party, the more the recruits became active participants
themselves, a form of positive feedback. Improving active participation in the party is a key role of activists,
more common than the level of recruitment itself [6, 8, 49]. In each of the four applications f(At) had a
significant variation. For Labour in the 1940s the fraction rose from a third to over 40% with the fraction of
the party active increasing substantially to 1952, Fig. 1(c). The value of f(At) returned to a third by 1955,
with the party becoming increasingly inactive. In the case of the SNP an increasing value of this fraction
led to almost half the party active by 2012, Fig. 3c. Thus this modelling construct is believed to have added
to the explanatory power of the model.
It is noted that in all four application areas the duration recruiting activist was short, sometimes only
a matter of days, and that at any given time the number of recruiting activists was low, less than 0.1% of
the party. Such figures are typical of word-of-mouth models applied to organisations with rapid growth,
for example churches [32], in contrast to more individualised processes [e.g. 13, 19, 22] where the duration
influential is longer. Political parties, like churches, have influential recruiters who only engage in recruitment
activities for a small portion of a month. Seyd and Whiteley [5] state that most activists devote no more
than 10 hours a month to party activities, which would mainly be organised regular party meetings. It would
be expected that recruitment activities would likewise be conducted in small but repeated blocks, rather
than one continuous period. Thus the short timescales of recruitment activity may reflect the actual time
spent recruiting with periods of inactivity removed as aggregate models smooth the behaviour of different
individuals over time.
Although the model worked well over periods where there was a sustained recruitment campaign, or
lack of one, it was not able to handle a sudden change in membership due to external political events. The
massive increase in SNP membership in the days following the Scottish independence referendum could not
be predicted by the model. It is likely that a significant realignment towards the SNP took place during the
18-month long referendum campaign, but did not manifest itself in party membership until the referendum
result was known. It is possible that the “No” vote mobilised supporters of independence to join the SNP
to continue the pressure for more devolved power for Scotland. Such a process could be modelled as a
word-of-mouth process, where the closed non-member population in the Limited Activist model was allowed
to change through the influence of supporters for independence. Such an extended model would be more
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complex than the Limited Activist one presented, a complexity unnecessary for most situations of party
growth and decline.
The model could also be extended by allowing the activists to have a role in reactivating the long-term
inactive members, rather than just the new recruits. Unlike recruitment campaigns it is not clear what the
arena for such influence would be. Former active members could be contacted through friendship networks,
however inactive members who had never engaged with the party may not be so easily contactable. Such an
extension would require the disaggregation of the inactive members, raising further issues with estimating
the ratio of the different types of new subpopulations and the extra parameters involved.
The limitation of a purely population model of growth should be noted. The model limits the growth
hypothesis to word of mouth. It is known that activists also have a role in building the party’s political
legitimacy which in turn enhances growth [11]. Such legitimacy also influences the engagement of party
members, which in the model was approximated by the fraction of the party active f(At). It would be
interesting to explicitly include such legitimacy in the model as a variable, but this would be a non-population
variable which would require care in its construction and use. Such an idea is reserved for a future publication.
It is proposed that the Limited Activist model put forward in this paper has sufficient richness to relate
results to historical events, yet is simple enough to avoid over parametrisation. The model is recommended
as useful first attempt in modelling political party growth that researchers could use to explore and test on
other data.
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Appendix A. Party Membership Data
Year 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953
Membership 266 487 645 608 629 730 908 876 1,015 1,005
Table A.5: Labour Party Membership 1944-1953 (000s) [48]
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Membership 266 305 365 400 405 388 361 311 272 248 215 198
Table A.6: Labour Party Membership 1993-2004 (000s) [48]
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Membership 9.5 10.9 11.0 12.6 13.9 15.1 15.6 16.2 20.1 24.7 25.2
Table A.7: Scottish Nationalist Party Membership 2003-2013 (000s) [48]
Year 2005 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013
Membership 258 290 250 177 150 134
Table A.8: Conservative Party Membership 2005–2013 (000s) [48, 58]
Appendix B. Proof A+ < 0 given pˆ > 0
If A+ = pˆ− qˆI¯+ < 0 then using (13):
2a1 − qˆ
(
b1/pˆ+
√
(b1/pˆ)2 − 4a1c1/pˆ2
)
< 0 (B.1)
as a1 > 0 and pˆ > 0
(B.1) can be re-arranged as:
2a1 − qˆb1/pˆ < qˆ
√
(b1/pˆ)2 − 4a1c1/pˆ2 (B.2)
There are two options, either 2a1 < qˆb1/pˆ in which case the left hand side of (B.2) is negative and the
result immediately follows, or 2a1 > qˆb1/pˆ. In the latter case (B.2) can be squared as both sides are positive:
(2a1 − qˆb1/pˆ)
2
< qˆ2
(
(b1/pˆ)
2 − 4a1c1/pˆ
2
)
. This simplifies to 0 < gατi + g, thus proved.
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